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Abstract
In a region  with shared  water  aquifers,  the  use  of water  by one  country  becomes  an
externality  to  another.  A policy  to  subsidize  water  is shown  to  lead  to  both countries  being
made  worse  off,  but  is likely  to  be  supported  by  special  interests  having  water  rights,  and
those  in  sectors  such  as  agricultural  that uses  water  relatively  intensively.  The  unilateral
water  tax  will  reduce  own country's  GNP  and  rise  GNP  in the  other  country.  Only  when
both  countries  impose  a tax cooperatively,  will  GNP  rise  in both  countries.
Professor  and  Graduate  student,  respectively,  Department  of Agricultural  and  Applied  Economics,
University  of  Minnesota.  This  paper  is  based  on  the  presentation  for  the  International  Conference  on
Coordination  and Decentralization  in Water  Resource  Management,  Hebrew  University of Jerusalem,  Rehovot,
Israel,  October  3 - 7, 1994.1. Introduction
The  water  resources  of Israel,  Jordan,  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank  are  limited  and  their  use
by one  impinges  on the  use  by another.  This paper  focuses  on water  use by one  region  as
an  externality  to  another  in an environment  where  one  region  is relatively  more  endowed
with  capital  so that  its  comparative  advantage  lies in manufacturing  while  the  other  lies  in
agriculture.  Water  consumption  in this  area  has  been  outstripping  currently  sustainable
water  yields, resulting  in a drop  in water  tables  and  the infiltration  of seawater  into  aquifers
(Berck  and Lipow,  1994).  Even though  agriculture  contribute  less than  7%  to GNP  in Israel
and  13%  in Jordan,  the sector  uses  75%  of total  water  supplies.  Moreover,  the  cost of water
tends  to be heavily  subsidized  by most of countries  in this region.  (Naff, 1994).  As  this area
continues  to  develop  and  become  more  open  to  world  markets,  increased  pressures  are
likely  to  be  placed  on  already  limited  supplies  of  water.  These  pressures  will  surely
encourage  further  reconsideration  of water  policy, and  how own country  and  other  country
policy will impact  on water  use,  the  sectoral  composition  of output,  and  returns  to  factors
of production.  Questions  as  to  the  nature  of the  strategic  interdependence  that  water
imposes  on  policy,  and  the  gains  and  losses  form  cooperative  versus  non-cooperative
behavior  are  likely  to  be  among  issues  at  the  top  of the  policy  agenda.  Since  water  is an
economy  wide resource,  a general  equilibrium  framework  is the  best  tool  to deal  with such
issues.
Given  that water  resources  are limited, pumping  groundwater  from an aquifer  by one
country  tends  to reduce  the  amount  of water  available  to another  while  increasing  pumping
costs  and  the  risk of harm  to  the  aquifer.  This  kind  of an  externality  is usually  dealt  with
2in the  context  of property  rights  where  free  access  can  result  in a  "tragedy of commons".
(Brill  & Hochman,  1994).  This paper  does  not focus  on the  property  right problem  per se;
instead,  we  mainly  analyze  the  inter-country  effects  of water  policy.  A  simple  model  is
presented  in the next section,  and  its general  equilibrium  characteristics  described  in section
3.  The  model  is developed  to capture  essential  water-linkage  characteristics  of economies
in this  region.  Section  4  is divided  into  four  sub-sections  where  a  numerical  example  is
presented.  A  competitive  equilibrium  is  analyzed  in  the  first  subsection.  Due  to  the
externality,  the  price  of water,  rents  to  holders  of water  rights  and  factor  rental  rates  are
shown  to  differ  between  the  two  countries.  In  the  next  sub-section,  water  subsidies  are
analyzed.  It is shown  that a subsidy in one  country  causes  GNP to fall in both countries,  but
the  indirect  effect  on  the  other  country  is greater  than  the  negative  direct  effect  on  the
country  imposing  the  subsidy.  Various  levels  of unilateral  and  bilateral  water  taxes  are
considered  in the  third  subsection.  These  results  confirm  that  the  competitive  equilibrium
with no  tax or subsidy  is equivalent  to  a prisoner's  dilemma,  while  the  cooperative  solution
is  to  impose  a  water  use  tax  in both  countries.  The  effect  of relative  differences  in  the
efficiency of water generation  technology  is considered  in the  last subsection.  Summary  and
comments  conclude  the  paper.
2.  Basic Structure of the Model
There  are  two  small  open  economies:  A and  B,  each  producing  two  final  goods,  X
(manufacturing  good)  and  Y (farm  good)  and  one  intermediate  good,  water  H.  Individual
utility  is  a  function  of the  two  final  goods,  and  assumed  to  be  homothetic  and  identical
across  countries.  Production  of the  final  goods  uses  two  primary  inputs  L and  K and  theintermediate  input,  water.  The  generation  of water  (pumping,  processing,  distributing)  uses
L and  K  as  inputs,  but  the  efficiency  of these  inputs  is affected  negatively  by the  level  of
water  use  in the  other  country.  The  final  goods  are  tradable  while water  is non-tradable.
The  primary  inputs  are mobile  between  the  two final  good and  the  one  intermediate
good  sectors,  but  they  are  immobile  across  countries.  While  country  A is assumed  to own
more  K  than  country  B,  the  amount  of endowment  L is  assumed  to  be  the  same  in  both
countries.  By  this  assumption,  country  A  is  richer  than  country  B.  The  final  good
technologies  are  constant  returns  to  scale  and  identical  across  countries.  Sector  X  is
assumed  to be  K  intensive  and  sector  Y is L intensive,  i.e., the  input  ratio,  Kx/L x  > Ky/L,
holds  for any factor  prices.  In addition,  for each  unit  of output,  sector  Y is assumed  to use
more  water  than  sector  X, i.e.,Hy/Y  > Hx/X.
To  capture  the  scale  effect  of water  generation,  the  technology  to  withdraw  and
distribute  water  is assumed  to  exhibit  diminishing  returns  in L and  K,  hence,  contrary  to
other  sectors,  there  is positive  profit  or rent  in this  sector.  The  rent  occurs  to  holders  of
water  property  rights.  The  technology  of water  is  identical  across  countries;  later  this
assumption  is relaxed.  Water  is assumed  to be  extracted  from  a  single  aquifer  shared  by
both  countries.  The  capacity  of the aquifer  is fixed so the  cost of water  withdrawal  depends
on the  water  table  of the  aquifer.  Consequently,  generating  water  from  this aquifer  by one
country  will  reduce  the  water  table  and  increase  the  water  extraction  costs  of the  other
country.  In this  simple  static  model,  we assume  that  the  aquifer  is replenished  in the  rainy
season.  The  interdependence  between  countries  is the  negative  externality  emanating  from
the  effect  of one  country's water  consumption  on the  other's  cost of water  extraction.  That
4is, for the  same  levels of capital  and  labor,  the amount  of water  generated  by country  A (B)
is  smaller  if the  supply  of the  water  from  country  B  (A)  increases.  Thus,  the  water
generation  function  can  be  written  as
HA  = h(LhA,KhAH*-HB),
HB  =  h(LhB,KhB,H*-HA),
where  H* is the  fixed amount  of water  in the  aquifer.  Hi  is strictly  increasing  and  constant
returns  to  scale  in (Li,Kh',H*-Hj)  e R3+ and  hence  decreasing  returns  to  scale  in  (Lh',Kh).
As country j's water  supply enters  country  i's water  generation  function  negatively,  we have
aHA/ aHB  < 0 and  aHB/  HA  < 0.
3. General Equilibrium with a Shared Aquifer
For the  small  open economy  without  any policy distortion,  the  equilibrium  prices  for
tradable  goods,  Px and  Py are  treated  exogenously,  and  hence  the  unit cost  functions  for X
and  Y  equal  the  equilibrium  prices.  I.e.,
x(Wi,r'i,Ph)  =  Px
cy(wi,r',Ph)  =  Py,
where  w' is  wage,  r  is capital  rent  and  Ph' is the  water  price  final  good  producers  pay.  In
the  absence  of externalities  and  policy distortions,  this price  should be  equalized  among  the
final  good  producers,  and  equal  to  the  marginal  cost  of water  generation  within  each
country.
The  rent  from  water  generation  is  the  difference  between  water  revenue  and  its
production  cost.  Since  the  term  H*-H j  in the  function  is not  a choice  variable  in the  i-th
country,  the  maximized  rent  can  be written  as
5II(wi,rPh',I)  =  7h(wri,Phi)H,  i  = A,  B.
where  HI  =  H*-Hj,  i * j, is  an externality  term,  and  7rh(.)  can  be  treated  as  a shadow  price
of the  rights  to  access  the  water  resource.  Then,  from  the  envelope  theorem,  the  supply
function  of water  can  be  derived  by  differentiating  IIh(.)  with  respect  to  Ph'.  As  a  non-
tradable  good,  the  price  of water  can be  derived  as  a function  of the  final  good  prices  and
the  externality  term  by setting  its  supply  being  equal  to  its demand.  I.e.,Ph'  = Ph(PxPy-).
Usually,  a  non-tradable  good price  should  be equal  between  countries  if the  model  has only
two  final  good  production  sectors  and  two  primary  inputs.  However,  as  there  exists  an
externality  in our model,  if HA  is not  equal  to HB, that  is, if two  countries  generate  and  use
different  amounts  of water  (which  is common  when  the  water  input  and  final  good  output
ratios  are  different  between  industries,  and  when  the  outputs  of  final  good  production
sectors  are  different  between  countries)  then  the marginal  cost and  hence  the  price of water
can  differ  between  countries.
Prices  for  primary  inputs,  w'  and  r'  can  be  solved  from  the  final  good  unit  cost
functions,  expressed  as  a function  of the  final  good  prices  and  water  price,  and  then,  as  a
function  of the  final  good  prices  and  the  externality.  I.e,
w'  = w(Px,Py,H)
r'  = r'(Px,Py, I H),i  = A,  B.
Even  though  the  technologies  of final  good  production  are  identical  across  countries,  the
wages  and  capital  rental  rates  differ  if HA  differs  from  -I/.
From  the market  clearing  conditions  for endowments,  and  the  equilibrium  condition
for water,  the  supply  of X and  Y can  be  expressed  as  the  function  of the  final  good  prices,
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Xi  = X(P,9PyXX;YW
Xi  = X(Px,Py,jKi;H).
The  aggregate  demand  functions  for  X  and  Y  can  be  derived  from  maximizing
aggregate  utility  given GNP  as a  budget  constraint:
Xi  = x(Px,Py,GNPi)
Yi  = y(P,,Py,GNP,),
where
GNPi  =  W(PX,Py,H')Li  +  T(PxPy,')R  +  rh(w'(Px,Py ,H),r'  yi(,PpIP)  ,Py,,))',
which  is defined  by the  returns  to endowments  and  the  rents  to  holders  of water  rights.
Excess  demand  is given by:
EXi  = Xi - X'
EYi  = Y  - Y'.
Since  LA  =  LB,  RA  > KB,  and  since  X  is capital  intensive,  country  A  exports  (imports)  X
(Y)  while  country  B  has  the  opposite  trading  pattern.
Further,  since  each  country's  water  supply  is  an  externality  in  the  other  country's
water  supply function,  a competitive  equilibrium  is equivalent  to a Nash  equilibrium.  That
is,  if the  firm in each  country's  water  sector  maximizes  its  profit  given  the  other  country's
water  supply  being  at  its optimal  level, under  competitive  equilibrium,  a  Nash  equilibrium
can  be  obtained.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  supply  of water  in  country  j not  only  affects
country i's supply of water, but also this country's supply of final  good X and  Y, the unit  cost
of factor  inputs  w and  r, the  price  of water,  Ph,  the  profit  of water  extracting,  IIh,  and  thenational  income,  GNP.  Furthermore,  as  consumer's  demand  for  final  goods  depends  on
GNP,  the  demand  for X  and  Y  is  affected  indirectly.
Hence,  as  two  countries  share  a  common  water  aquifer,  the  general  equilibrium
linkages  between  them  becomes  surprisingly complicated  and inter-linked.  Effectively,  any
policy affecting  the  equilibrium  in one  country  affects  the  other  country's water  supply  and
demand.  In the  next section,  we use  a  simple  sample  economy  to describe  and  discuss  the
nature  of these  linkages.
4. General Equilibrium Effects of Water Policies
Of the  two countries  in this  sample  economy,  A can be viewed  as representing  Israel,
and  B  represents  the  West  Bank,  Gaza  and  perhaps  Jordan.  All  assumptions  made  in
section  2  are  satisfied  here.  The  production  functions  for  X and  Y, the  water  generation
function  and  utility function  are  presented  in Appendix.  First  we  consider  the  case  where
the  technology  of water  generation  is identical  across  countries.
4.1 Competitive  Equilibrium  with  No  Water  Policy
Since  water  is  non-tradable  between  countries,  at  the  equilibrium,  country  A's
manufacturing  sector  accounts  for  84%  of  GNP  and  agriculture  the  remainder  (16%).
Country  B's manufacturing  sector  is 54%  and  agriculture  is 46%  of its  GNP.  Without  any
policy distortion,  the  equilibrium  results  show that  country  A has  comparative  advantage  in
manufacturing  as  the  output  of  its  manufacturing  sector  is  99%  higher  than  B's,  while
country  B has comparative  advantage  in agriculture  with an output  1.2 times higher than  A's.
As a result,  country  A exports  the  manufacturers  good X and  imports  the  agricultural  good
Y from the rest of the  world while B has  the opposite  position.  Country  A's exports  account
8for 28.3% of its manufacturing  output  and  imports  are  1.45 times  its agricultural  output.  In
the  case  of B, exports  account  for 13.8% of its agricultural  output  and  the  imports  account
for  18.4%  of its  manufacturing  output.  Since  agriculture  uses  more  water  for per  unit  of
output,  the  water  supply  and  demand  in country  B  is 7.2% higher  than  in country  A.
Contrary  to the Heckscher-Ohlin  framework,  the different  water  supply and  demands
results  in different  prices  for water  and  primary  factor  inputs.  The  price  of water  in country
A is 0.15% higher than  in country B,  while the  wage-capital  rental  ratio  in country  B is 0.7%
higher  than  in country  A.
4.2 Effects  of the  Subsidy  Policy
As  the  equilibrium  solution  of this  model  has  a  Nash  equilibrium  property,  the
behavior  of the  policy makers  in each  country  is easily modeled  as  a  one  shot  Nash  game.
First, consider  the  case  of a water  subsidy.  The  subsidy  may  result  from  the  rent  seeking
of agricultural  producers  as a way to combat  import  competition  and or the  holders  of water
rights.  We  have  simulated  three  possibilities  for this  policy:  (a)  only country  A subsidizes
water,  (b)  only country  B  subsidizes  water,  and  (c)  both  countries  subsidize  water.
A pervasive  general  equilibrium  result, regardless  of whether  subsidies  are unilateral
or bilateral,  is that  GNP  always falls  in both  countries.  This  result  is shown  in Appendix,
Figure  1 - 3.  Notice  that  if only country  A subsidizes,  GNP  falls more  in country  B than  in
country  A, while if only country  B subsidizes,  GNP  falls more  in country  A than  in country
B.  Hence,  the  indirect  effect  of the  subsidy  tends  to harm  the  other  country  more  than  the
direct  effect  on the  country  imposing  the  subsidy.  If both  subsidize,  the  decline  in GNP  is
larger  for both  countries.  Whether  the  rather  perverse  dominance  of the  indirect  effects
9over  the  direct  would  predominate  in a  model  collaborated  to  country  data  is unknown.
Nevertheless,  the  tendency  for  strong,  though  not  necessarily  dominant,  indirect  effects
would  likely remain.
The  decline  in GNP  is the result  of the  changes  in the  supply  of final  goods.  As the
subsidy  policy  causes  the  unit cost  of water  to  users  to fall,  the  demand  for and  supply  of
water  increase  in the  country  where  water  usage  is subsidized.  The  increased  supply in the
subsidized  country  causes  the  cost of water generation  in the  other  country  to increase  since
water  supply  is a negative  externality  in the  other  country's function.  Table  1 presents  the
affect  of water  subsidies  on  water  prices.
Table  1.  % Changes  in the  Prices  of Water  after  Subsidy
The  subsidy  rates  are  0.05-- 0.15
Subsidizing  countries  Country  A  Country  B  Both  Countries
Water  Price  in  (+)  (+)  (+)
Country  A  1.29 to 4.11  0.59 to  2.17  1.88 to  6.24
Water  Price  in  (+)  (+)  (+)
Country  B  0.52 to  1.89  1.28 to  4.07  1.80 to  5.91
The  sign (+)  indicates  that  the  change  is positive.  The  two  numbers  in each  cell  indicate
the  range  over which the price  of water  varies.  The  results  in Table  1 indicate  that the  price
of water  rises  in both  countries  regardless  of who subsidizes.  However,  the  user's price  of
water  only  rises  in the  no  subsidy  country  while  in the  subsidized  country  the  user's price
10falls.  This results  because  the use of water  increases  in the  subsidizing  country  which raises
water  costs  in the  other  country  so  that  its  use of water  falls.  If both  subsidize,  the  water
supply  increases  in both  countries  (see  Table  2).
Table  2.  % Changes  in Water  Supply  and  Demand  after  Subsidy
The  subsidy  rates  are  0.05  - 0.15
Subsidizing  Country  A  Country  B  Both  Countries
countries
Water  Supply  in  A  5.64  to  18.88  - 0.96  to  - 3.47  4.65 to  15.02
Water  Supply  in  B  - 0.82  to  - 2.96  5.48  to  18.34  4.63  to  15.08
The  supply  of final  goods  are  also  affected  by a water  subsidy.  When  only  country
A  subsidizes,  the  supply  of  manufacturers  falls  and  agriculture  rises, in  country  A  while
manufacturing  rises  and  agriculture  falls  in  country  B.  When  only  country  B  subsidizes,
supply  of manufacturers  rises  and  agriculture  falls  in country  A while  manufacturers  falls
and  agriculture  rises  in country  B.  These  results  are  presented  in Table  3 and  imply  that
a country's agricultural  sector  can be benefited  from  an own subsidy  and  be  harmed  by the
other  country's  subsidy,  while  a country's  manufacturing  sector  can  be  harmed  by its  own
country  subsidy  and  can  be benefited  from  the  other  country's  subsidy.
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The
in Supply  of Final  Goods  after  Subsidy
subsidy  are  0.05 -- 0.15
Subsidizing  countries  Country  A  Country  B  Both  Countries
Country  A  X  (-)  (+)  (-)
-1.65  to  -5.44  0.19 to 0.70  -1.46 to  -4.73
Y  (+)  (-)  (+)
8.45 to 27.04  -1.54 to  -5.63  6.91 to  21.49
Country  B  X  (+)  (-)  (-)
0.31 to  1.13  -3.17 to  -10.44  -2.85 to  -9.30
Y  (-)  (+)  (+)
-0.59to -2.15  3.65 to  11.67  3.05 to  9.55
From  the  perspective  of comparative  advantage  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  when
Country  A subsidizes  water,  both countries'  export industries  are  implicitly taxed,  and  hence
the  exports  of these  sectors  fall.  If country  B  subsidizes  water  usage,  then  both  countries'
export  industries  are  implicitly  subsidized.  When  both  countries  subsidize,  the  supply  of
manufacturers  falls  and  agriculture  rises  in  both  countries.  Furthermore,  the  rise  in
agricultural  output  in country  A, which does  not  have comparative  advantage  in this  sector,
is greater  than  in country  B.
The  water  subsidy  can  also  encourage  rent  seeking  on  the  part  of groups  holding
water  rights.  As  the  technology  of water  generation  exhibits  diminishing  returns  to  scale,
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Table  3.holders  of water  rights  obtain positive  rents.  Simulation  results  show that  the  rent  to water
rights  increases  in the  country  imposing  the  subsidy  while  it decreases  in the  other  country.
Hence,  a non-cooperative  game between  holders  of water rights in the  two countries  obtains.
When  both  countries  impose  water  subsidies,  the  profits  increase  in both  countries.  These
results  are  shown  in Appendix,  Figure  4 - 6.
Hence,  a  country's  water  rights  policy,  such  as  licensing,  will benefit  the  interest
group  who has  such  rights,  while  the  subsidy  policy  in the  other  country  will hurt  it.  The
increased  rent to water  rights not only occurs  from the increase  in the  water  supply, but also
from  the  increase  in water  price,  since  as  Table  1 shows  that  the  producer  price  of water
rises  in both  countries  after  subsidy  and  it rises  more  in the  country  imposing  the  subsidy.
Labor  and  capital  rental  rates  are  also affected  by the  subsidy;  these  are  changes  are
summarized  in Table  4.
Table  4.  % Changes  in the Factor Prices after  Subsidy, the subsidy  rates  are 0.05 -- 0.15
Subsidizing  countries  Country  A  Country  B  Both  Countries
Country  A  w  2.03 to  6.61  -0.31 to  -1.12  1.73 to 5.49
r  -0.18 to  -0.58  0.03 to 0.10  -0.16 to  -0.48
Country  B  w  -0.27 to -0.98  2.04 to  6.64  1.77 to  5.66
r  0.02 to 0.09  -0.18 to  -0.58  -0.16 to  -0.50
Table  4 shows that  wage rental  rates  rise and  capital  rental  rates  fall  in the  country
imposing  a  subsidy  while  wage  falls  and  capital  rental  rates  rise  in  the  country  not
13subsidizing  water.  In the  case  of a unilateral  subsidy, wage  rises  and  capital  rental  rates  fall
in the both  countries.  The  main reason  for these  results  is that  agriculture  is labor intensive,
while manufacturing  is capital  intensive.  As the  water  use  subsidy  causes  the  supply of the
agricultural  good to increase  and  the  supply of manufacturing  good to decrease,  demand  for
labor  increases  relative  to  the  demand  for capital.  Hence,  labor  becomes  more  expensive
while capital  becomes  cheaper  in the  subsidy  country.  On  the  other  hand,  as the  supply  of
agriculture  falls, wage  falls and  capital  rental  rate  rises  in the  no  subsidy  country.
4.3 Effects  of Tax  Policy
Usually,  a tax policy can be  chosen  to reduce  the  degradation  of a common  resources
like  water.  However  policy makers  typically only consider  the  effects  on their  own country
and  ignore  the  negative  effects  on  other  countries.  Similar  to  the  above  analysis,  we
simulate  three  possible  choices:  (a)  only country A taxes,  (b)  only country  B taxes,  (c)  both
countries  tax.  One  choice  is equivalent  to the  Pareto  optimal  solution  over both  countries.
The  simulation  results  show  that  GNP  falls  in the  country  imposing  the  tax,  while
GNP  rises  in  the  other  country.  However,  if  both  countries  adopt  such  policy,  both
countries  can  be  made  better  off!  Thus,  if policy  is required  to prevent  a deterioration  of
the  aquifer,  say  from  salt  water  incursion,  then,  without  cooperation,  one  country  may  be
induced  to  free  ride  on the  other  country's  efforts  to  conserve  the  resource.  These  results
are  shown  in Appendix,  Figure  7 - 9.  A Nash  equilibrium  is shown  in Table  5.
14Table  5.  % Changes  in GNP  of Nash  Equilibrium  with Tax,  tax rate  is 0.10
Country  B
Country  A  No Tax  Tax  Water
No Tax  (0; 0)*  (0.144; -0.104)
Tax Water  (-0.078;0.174)  (0.069; 0.074)**
*The  Nash  solution.  **The  cooperative  solution.
Table  5  shows  in the  lower  left  cell  that,  if country  A  imposes  a tax  rate  of 0.1  on
users  of water,  then  its GNP  falls 0.078% while  country  B's GNP  rises  0.174%.  If country
B  taxes,  its  GNP  falls  0.104%  while  country  A's  GNP  rises  0.144%.  Thus,  without
cooperative  behavior,  no country  is likely to impose  a tax unilaterally.  Obviously,  the  Nash
equilibrium  is equivalent  to a Prisoner's dilemma.  But,  under  cooperative  behavior,  if both
countries  tax, country  A's GNP  rises  0.069%  and  B's rises  0.074% at  tax  rate  of 0.1.
The  main  reason  for the  fall in GNP  of the  country  imposing  the  tax unilaterally  is
that  the  rise  in the  unit cost of water  causes  the  supply  and  demand  for water  in the  taxing
country  to  fall.  This  decline  lowers  the  negative  effect  on  the  water  supply  of the  other
country,  which  in turn,  results  in an decline  in the  unit cost of water  in the  other  country.
Table  6  presents  the  changes  in water  price  after  tax.
15Table  6.  % Changes  in the  Prices  of Water  after  Tax,  the  tax  rates  are  0.05 -- 0.15
Taxing countries  Country  A  Country  B  Both  Countries
Water  Price  in A  (-)  (-)  (-)
-1.23 to  -3.50  -0.49 to  -1.28  -1.72 to -4.78
Water  Price  in B  (-)  (-)  (-)
-0.44 to  -1.15  -1.21  to  -3.46  -1.65 to  -4.61
A  tax  causes  the  price  of water  to  holders  of water  rights  to  fall  in both  countries
regardless  who  taxes.  As  this price  of falls, the  demand  for water  and  hence  the  supply  of
water  increase  in the  no  tax  country.  However  for the  taxing  country,  the  user  price  of
water  rises  after  the  tax.  Thus,  we  observe  that  the  decline  in the  supply  and  demand  of
water  in  taxing  country  is  greater  than  the  increase  in  the  same  indicator  in the  non-tax
country  (see  Table  7).
Table  7.  % Changes  in Water  Supply  and  Demand  after  Tax,  the  taxes  are  0.05 --0.15
Taxing  countries  Country  A  Country  B  Both  Countries
Water  Supply  in  (-)  (+)  (-)
A  -5.11 to  -14.01  0.81 to  2.15  -4.32 to  -12.09
Water  Supply  in  (+)  (-)  (-)
B  0.71  to  1.86  -4.97 to  -13.65  -4.29 to -11.97
16Since  agriculture  is the  intensive  user  of water,  its production  falls.  Even  though  the
supply  of water  to  the  less  intensive  sector,  manufacturing,  rises  slightly,  the  increase  is
smaller  than  the  decline  in  agriculture.  Hence,  GNP  falls  in the  taxing  country.  On  the
other hand,  in the non-taxing  country,  the  increase  in agriculture  is greater  than  the decrease
in  manufacturing,  which thus  results  in a positive  change  in its  GNP.  Such  supply  effects
are  shown  in Table  8.
Table  8.  % Changes  in the  Supply  of Final  Goods  after  Tax,  the  tax are  0.05 -- 0.15
Taxing  countries  Country  A  Country  B  Both  Countries
Country  A  X  1.52  to  4.24  -0.16  to  -0.42  1.36  to  3.82
Y  - 7.97  to  - 22.65  1.31  to  3.42  - 6.66  to  - 19.26
Country  B  X  - 0.27  to  - 0.70  2.91  to  8.09  2.65  to  7.41
Y  0.51  to  1.34  - 3.44  to  - 9.77  - 2.93  to  - 8.44
As Table  7 shows, when  both  countries  tax, the  supply of and  demand  for water  fall
in both  countries,  but  in each  country  the  falling  rates  are  smaller  than  if a  tax  is imposed
unilaterally.  Consequently,  the  decline  in  agriculture  is  smaller  than  in  the  case  of  a
unilaterally  tax, as  shown in Table  8.  Hence,  both  country's GNP  rises  and  both  are  made
better  off.  Furthermore,  when  both countries  tax, the  supply of agricultural  sector  falls less
in country  B  (where  its comparative  advantage  lies)  than  in country  A.
Figure 9 (for both countries  tax) also shows that  there  exists an optimal  level of taxes
for  the  two  countries  as  the  change  in  GNP  to  tax  levels  is  concave.  The  versicle  axis
17measures  the  percent  change  in GNP  relative  to  the  no tax level  of GNP.  Hence,  over the
entire  domain  of the tax rate  shown on the horizontal  axes, GNP  in both countries  rise.  The
level  of bilateral  taxes  that  maximize  both  countries'  GNP  is shown at  0.1.
In fact, the  optimal  level tax can be solved  from a cooperative  optimization  problem.
That  is, by maximizing  two countries'  total  GNP,  subject  to  the  resource  constraints  in each
country:
Max  Px(X A+XB)  +  Py(YA+YB)
s.t. Xi  = F(Lxi,Kx,Hx i )
Yi  = G(LyKy',Hy')
HxA+HyA  =  h(LhAKhAH*-(HxB +HyB))
HxB+HyB  = h(LhBKhBH*-(HxA+HA))
Lx'+Ly'+Ly' =
K  +Ky+Kyi  =  Ki  , i  =  A, B.
From  the  first order  condition  for this optimal  problem,  the  users  in each  country  not  only
pay  the  price  of water  they  use,  but  they  also  pay the  damage  caused  by their  use  on  the
other  country's  supply  of water.  That  is,
Px(aX'I  aHxi)  =  h i  +  1  I(aHJ/  a(H*-Hi))
Py(aX'l aHyi)  =  Xhi  +  1 ~9(aHJ/  (H*-H1))
where  Xh'  is the  shadow  price  of water  in country  i, i =  A,B.  The  marginal  damage  of the
externality,  aHJl a(H*-H/),  is  equal  to  the  negative  shadow  price  of water  rights,  and  it  is
equal  to  the  tax rate  adjusted  by the  price  of water  in the  country.  I.e.,
t=  (aH'/  H)(Ph/Ph,  i  j.
18The  simulation  result  of  optimal  tax  rates  solved  from  the  above  optimal  problem  is
1.099447 for country  A  and  1.099407 for country  B.
The  tax policy  affects  rents  to  holders  of water  rights.  Simulation  results  show  that
the rents  fall in the country  imposing, unilaterally,  taxes  on water.  When  both countries  tax,
the  rents  to water  rights fall in both  countries.  These  results  are  shown  in Appendix,  Figure
10 - 12.  Almost  surely, the  decline  in rents  to holders  of water  rights  will give rise to their
willingness  to engage  in collective  action  to prevent  such a policy.
The  changes  in factor  prices  are  presented  in Table  9.
Table  9.  % Changes  in the  Factor  Prices  after  Tax,  the  tax  are  0.05 -- 0.15
Taxing  countries  Country  A  Country  B  Both  Countries
Country  A  w  (-)  (+)  (-)
-1.89to  -5.31  0.26 to 0.68  -1.63 to  -4.65
r  (+)  (-)  (+)
0.17 to  0.50  -0.02 to  -0.06  0.15 to 0.43
Country  B  w  (+)  (-)  (-)
0.23 to 0.61  -1.90 to  -5.33  -1.67 to  -4.73
r  (-)  (+)  (+)
-0.02 to  -0.05  0.17 to 0.50  0.15 to 0.44
In contrast  to  the  simulation  results  reported  in Table  4, where  changes  in  factor
prices after  subsidy are  shown, taxes and  subsidies  affect  factor price  contrarily.  The  reason
19is the  same  as  given for  Table  4.
4.4 Effects  of Different  Technology
Now,  we relax  the  identical  technology  assumption  and  assume  that  country  A  has
:.  sore  efficient  technology  in water  generation.  Let  the  technical  coefficient  da  in country
A be  1.01 and  db be  still 1. Because  of this assumption,  the price  of water  in country  A falls
relative  to  the  price  of water  in country  B.  (Under  the  same  technology  assumption,  the
price  of water  is lower  in country  B.)  The  result  is that  more  water  is consumed  in country
A.  Consequently,  the  price of water  rises  in country  B,  leading  to a  fall in its  supply of and
demand  for water.
A cheaper  water  supply  in country  A causes  its  supply of manufacturing  to decrease
and  agriculture  to increase  since  agriculture  is the  relatively  intensive  user  of this economy
wide resource.  On  the  other  hand,  a more  expensive  water  supply in country  B  causes  that
the  opposite  results  to  obtain.  Thus,  country  A's GNP  rises  while  country  B's GNP  falls
relative  to the  status  quo of identical  technologies.  These  results  are  presented  in Table  10.
20Table  10.  Simulation  Results  Caused  by Changing  in Technology  of Water  Supply  (%)
5. Conclusions
Treating  water  policy  choices  as  a  set  of Nash  equilibrium  strategies,  a  policy  to
subsidize  water  is shown to  lead  to  both  countries  being  made  worse  off, as  is also  shown
to be the  case  of a no water's  policy.  A policy to  subsidize  water  yields higher  rents  to the
holders  of water rights, and  to those  whose  incomes  are  derived  from the  sectors  using water
relatively  intensively,  i.e,  agriculture.  Thus,  under  some  not  unreasonable  political
environments,  "bad policy" is likely to be supported  by special  interests  having  water  rights,
and  those  in sectors  such  as agricultural  that  uses  water  relatively  intensively.
To internalize  the  negative  effects  of water  use  in one  country  on those  in another,
as  well as  to  retard  the  degradation  of water  resources,  a tax policy  should  be  considered.
However,  unilaterally  imposing  tax  will reduce  own country's  GNP  and  rise  GNP  in the
other  country.  Only when both countries  impose  a tax simultaneously,  will GNP rise in both
21
Country  A  Country  B
Price  of water  -3.926  0.628
Supply  of water  6.796  -0.996
Supply  of X  -1.324  0.378
Supply  of Y  10.721  -0.721
GNP  0.631  -0.132countries.  Still, a  cooperative  tax policy only benefits  both  countries'  manufacturing  sector,
while  agricultural  output  will  fall  as  will  rents  to  holders  of water  rights.  Our  analysis
ignored  the  question  of water  rights.  In the  absence  of water  rights,  agents  would  attempt
to compete  for the  positive  rents  to  holders  of these  rights,  eventually  driving  rents  toward
zero.  The  result  would  be  similar  to our analysis  of the  effects  of subsidies,  which as these
results  suggest,  tend  have  greater  and  negative  other  country  effects  than  they have  on  own
country  effects.
The  analysis  here  is  clearly  abstract  and  hypothetical.  Nevertheless,  it  raises  key
questions  that  appear  to be of key importance  and  worthy of further  investigation.  The  next
step  should  entail  a  far  more  detailed  investigation  which  relies  on  country  data.  Since
water  is an  economy  wide  resource,  a  broad  based  economy  wide framework  appears  to  be
required.
22Appendix
1. Production  functions  for X and  Y
X  = F(Lx,Kx,Hx)  =  Lx0.25 Kx065  Hx 1
Y  = G(Ly,KY,H,)  =  Ly.*5 Ky0.25 Hy0 25
which are  identical  for both  countries,  and  Li  is labor,  Ki  is capital  and  Hi  is water
used  in  sector  i.
2. Water  extracting  technology
HA  =  hA(LA,KhAjB)  =  daLh0-4  Kh 0 5  (H*-HB)o .1
H"  =  hB(LhBKhB,HA)  =  dbLh0 4  Kh .5  ((H*-HA) 0.1
where  di  is  technical  coefficient.  For  the  first  model  it  is  assumed  to  be  unity  for  both
countries,  and  for the  second  model,  da  is greater  than  one  and  db  is still  one.
3. Utility  function
ui  = U(Xi,Yi)  = X0.6y
0.4
4. Factor  endowments
LA  =  100,  LB  =  100,
RA  =  180, RB  =  120.
5. Equilibrium  output  prices
Px = 0.75,Py = 1.
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